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  Abstract 
The empirical literature on the energy efficiency gap concentrates on demand 
inefficiencies in the energy-using durables markets and finds evidence that 
consumers underestimate future energy costs when purchasing a new 
appliance. We take a broader view and also consider the impact of imperfect 
competition. Using data on the UK refrigerator market (2002-2007), we find 
that the average energy consumption of appliances sold during this period was 
only 7.2% higher than what would have been observed under a scenario with a 
perfectly competitive market and non-myopic consumers. One reason for this 
small gap is that market power actually reduces energy use. 
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1. Introduction  
In energy and environmental policy circles, it is commonly believed that an 
“energy efficiency gap” exists between the desirable level of energy 
consumption and observed consumption (e.g. IEA 2007, Ryan et al. 2011). 
Since the seminal paper by Hausman (1979) and the discussion of possible 
policy implications by Jaffe and Stavins (1994), the energy efficiency gap has 
also attracted considerable interest in the academic literature (see the literature 
survey by Gillingham and Palmer 2014).  
To clarify the notion, it is necessary to distinguish two reasons that drive the 
gap between the actual and socially optimal levels of energy consumption. The 
first is the classic externality problem: the production and consumption of 
energy, in particular of fossil fuels, generate major environmental and health 
externalities which could be mitigated by policies promoting energy 
conservation. The energy efficiency gap refers to a second category of failures 
in the markets of energy-using durables. Energy efficiency outcomes involve 
decisions whereby consumers first make an upfront investment in durable 
goods and then consume energy through their use. Examples include water 
heaters, building insulation, motor vehicles and household appliances. The 
idea of the gap is rooted in a widespread belief that the market for energy-
using durables does not operate effectively, i.e. markets are not perfectly 
competitive with fully rational economic agents. As a result, the market 
equilibrium maintains an energy efficiency gap defined as a wedge between 
the cost-minimizing level of energy efficiency and the level actually reached. 
Policy discussions, as well as the academic literature, focus on the demand-
side of the markets (IEA, 2007; Ryan et al., 2011; Allcott and Greenstone, 
2012; Gillingham and Palmer, 2014). The key concern here is that imperfect 
information and other cognitive constraints could lead consumers to discard 
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privately profitable investments.
1
 More specifically, it is often asserted that 
consumers are myopic in the sense that they give too much weight to the 
upfront cost or, expressed differently, the discount rate implicitly used to 
calculate the net present value of the investment is too high. As a result, 
consumers use too much energy.  
This is only half of the picture, however. On the supply side, manufacturers of 
energy-using durables also make decisions. In particular, they choose product 
characteristics and set the price at which products are sold. In the case of 
household appliances, they have a great deal of influence as these markets 
tend to be very concentrated. In 2011, Whirlpool Corporations, AB Electrolux, 
General Electric Company, and LG Electronics represented 90% of the sales 
of major household appliances in the US (Alegria et al., 2012). In the UK, 
competition on the refrigerator market is seemingly more intense as the top 5 
companies represent around 46% of sales in our data for each year of the study 
period. However, product differentiation reduces competition as soon as we 
look at specific categories of products. For example, if we consider 
homogeneous segments of refrigerators or refrigerators-freezers that are either 
built-in or freestanding and of a specific energy efficiency class, the top 5 
represent around 67% of sales in each segment. 
In this paper, we consider both the role of potential consumer myopia and 
imperfect competition on energy consumption of refrigerators sold in the UK 
market. We use annual product-level panel data from 2002 to 2007 to analyze 
                                                 
1
 The nature of the underlying causes of demand inefficiencies is extensively discussed by 
Gillingham and Palmer (2014). Most of these causes are related to imperfect information. The 
simplest mechanism is when the decision-maker lacks information on the true benefits of 
energy efficiency investments. However, principal-agent problems can also arise when one 
party makes a decision related to energy use, and another party pays or benefits from that 
decision. For example, the landlord may pay for heating, while the tenant chooses how much 
energy to use. Another potential barrier is if the investor faces credit constraints that are 
stronger than for other investments because the lender finds it difficult to evaluate the payoff 
from energy-efficiency investments.  
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two types of decisions: consumer purchase decisions and suppliers’ price-
setting decisions. Next, we use our estimates to identify counterfactual 
scenarios with perfect competition and without consumer myopia. This gives 
us an estimate of the size of the energy efficiency gap which is defined in this 
paper as the difference between actual average energy consumption of sold 
appliances and the hypothetical consumption that would be observed in a 
perfectly competitive market with non-myopic consumers. 
Our approach provides a more comprehensive measurement of the energy 
efficiency gap than that available in the literature. As mentioned above, 
existing works mostly concentrate on demand inefficiencies as illustrated by 
the recent reviews by Allcott and Greenstone (2012) and Gillingham and 
Palmer (2014). We go further, by examining the role of suppliers and 
imperfect competition.
2
 We however limit ourselves to a study of the short-run 
equilibrium, where suppliers only choose prices, once product characteristics 
have been chosen. The impact of product innovation is left for future research. 
We also do not deal with all the imperfections that may influence energy use. 
In particular, we rule out any considerations related to the pricing of 
environmental externalities related to energy production and use or principal-
agents problems
3
 Our contribution to the relevant empirical literature is 
discussed in more detail in the next section. 
                                                 
2
 The academic literature is reviewed in the subsequent section. Supply side aspects have been 
studied for instance by Fischer (2005), Jacobsen (2013), Houde (2014a, 2014b), and Goldberg 
(1998). In contrast with our paper, these studies do not seek to measure the size of the energy 
efficiency gap. Rather they evaluate specific policy scenarios (e.g. standards, feebates, energy 
labeling, etc.). A limited industrial organization literature has also examined the functioning of 
appliance markets (e.g. Ashenfelter et al., 2103; Spurlock, 2014). 
3
 We also do not investigate how certain policies or regulations might alter the functioning of 
the markets. As an illustration, trade barriers may have hindered the imports of non-EU 
refrigerators during the study period. As appliances produced by well-known European brands 
tend to be more energy efficient than non-EU brands, removing barriers would increase 
energy use. 
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Although there is no universal definition of the energy efficiency gap, we are 
aware that our definition is not the most common, as we depart from the view 
that limits the energy efficiency gap to consumer behavior. We are however 
not the only scholars who integrate supply-side inefficiencies as a cause of the 
wedge between actual and optimal energy use (for instance, see the papers by 
Jaffe and Stavins (1994) or Gerarden et al. (2015)). One could question the 
relevance of integrating both demand-side and supply-side inefficiencies in a 
unified framework instead of studying these imperfections separately. Such a 
global assessment is necessary if the purpose of measuring the energy 
efficiency gap is to identify and justify desirable policy intervention, a point 
made before us by Fischer (2005) and, more recently, by Gerarden et al. 
(2015) who stress the importance of supply-side factors when designing 
policies to promote energy-efficient household appliances. Take the example 
of the subsidies on energy-efficient goods that are recommended by some 
economists to mitigate demand inefficiencies (e.g. Allcott, Mullainathan, and 
Taubinsky, 2014) and widely implemented in practice. If producers benefit 
from lower markups on energy-efficient goods than on less efficient ones – as 
is the case in the UK refrigerator market in this paper – then subsidies should 
be lower than they would be if prices were equal to marginal costs.
4
  
We model demand using a standard discrete choice model with differentiated 
quality based on Berry (1994). We take the first-difference to eliminate time-
invariant product attributes. A nested logit framework is used to control for 
product segmentation caused by product differentiation. To address 
endogeneity issues arising from the simultaneous determination of refrigerator 
prices and quantities, our instrumentation strategy incorporates data from two 
outside product markets – freezers and washing machines – which present 
                                                 
4
 Another option would be to adjust antitrust regulations, which is the primary policy tool to 
mitigate imperfect competition concerns. However this tool was not initially conceived for 
sector-specific adjustments.  
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different demand characteristics but technical similarities that lead production 
costs to be correlated. Choices made by suppliers in terms of prices and 
products offered on the market are estimated using reduced-form equations 
that impose few restrictions on how they compete on the market. More 
specifically, the price equation is estimated with a fixed-effect model in which 
shocks on market shares are used to identify the size of mark-ups. We identify 
the model using instruments that exploit a well-known effect in the marketing 
field, i.e. “extremeness aversion” (Simonson and Tversky, 1992), which 
affects demand for specific goods in a way that is unrelated to product features 
in absolute terms, and thus is not systematically correlated with production 
costs.  
What transpires from our estimates is that the impact of the two market 
imperfections on energy consumption is limited. On the demand side, we find 
that consumers underestimate future energy savings by 35% in our base 
specification which assumes a financial discount rate of 4.6%. This suggests 
investment inefficiencies of reasonable size, which is equivalent to applying 
an implicit discount rate of 11% to the stream of future electricity costs when 
calculating the net present value. In line with these numbers, our simulations 
show that myopia increases energy use by only 9.2% compared to a scenario 
in which consumers would correctly value future energy costs.  
The impact of imperfect competition is also modest, but goes in the opposite 
direction: it reduces energy use by 4.2% compared to a scenario with perfect 
competition. The reason is that products that consume more energy have 
higher market shares on average. Suppliers thus have more latitude to raise 
their price, which reduces demand. This pattern is likely to be true in other 
markets of energy-using consumer durables where competition is less intense 
or demand elasticity is lower for energy-intensive models. As the two 
imperfections exert opposite effects, the joint effect is a modest 7.2% increase 
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in energy use compared to a perfectly competitive market with fully rational 
consumers. 
These simulations therefore suggest that there would be few energy savings to 
expect from reaching a fully competitive market with non-myopic consumers.  
Likewise, we show that consumer myopia and imperfect competition have 
limited impact on social welfare (excluding environmental externalities, but 
including consumer surplus and profits). Consumer surplus
5
 would increase by 
around £76 per sale in the first best optimum  – just under 26% of the price of 
appliances – but most of this increase is a transfer from suppliers, as the 
overall increase in social welfare is only £18.10. These numbers convey an 
important message about public policies targeting the energy efficiency gap. 
With the exception of energy labeling, which seems to have been sufficient to 
mitigate imperfections in the UK refrigerator market, policies should primarily 
be concerned with the traditional environmental externality problem. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the second section, we briefly 
review the literature and justify why refrigerators constitute a suitable case 
study to investigate the functioning of durable goods markets. Section 3 
develops the conceptual framework. Section 4 presents the data. Section 5 
outlines our empirical strategy and addresses identification issues. Estimation 
results are presented in Section 6. In Section 7, we run simulations to predict 
the impacts on the energy consumption of sold appliances and evaluate the 
welfare impacts of imperfect competition and consumer myopia. Section 8 
summarizes our findings and formulates policy implications. 
                                                 
5
 Note that consumer surplus includes the utility that consumers derive from the other non-
energy related attributes of the products they purchase. 
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2. Related literature 
The empirical literature on the energy efficiency gap in the residential sector is 
well developed. As explained above, the majority of existing papers focus on 
demand and consumer myopia. Following the work of Hausman (1979) on 
room air conditioners, early research found implicit discount rates that are 
substantially larger than real financial discount rates. In the case of 
refrigerators, the reported rates range from 39% to 300% (Revelt and Train, 
1998; McRae, 1985; Meier and Whittier, 1983; Gately, 1980). More recent 
studies have suggested lower rates. For refrigerators, Tsvetanov and Segerson 
(2014) find discount rates in the 13-22% range in a study that looks at the 
impact of energy labeling on consumer surplus. The same pattern is found in 
recent papers dealing with gasoline prices and fuel efficiency. Allcott and 
Wozny (2014), whose methodological approach is similar to ours, find a 
discount rate of 16%. Busse et al. (2013) produce several estimates under 
different assumptions, none of which exceed 20% and many of which are 
close to zero. The same pattern is found by Goldberg (1998). 
There are several reasons that explain why recent works, including ours, find 
lower discount rates than earlier studies. The most important reason is the use 
of panel data, which allows better control of unobserved product 
characteristics. Indeed, using a hedonic pricing model on a cross section of 
products as done by Hausman (1979), we find a discount rate of 210% (shown 
in online Appendix K). Another reason may also relate to the fact that 
consumers are better informed. For example, energy labeling has been 
mandatory in the European Union for many appliances, including 
refrigerators, since 1995. In the US and in Canada, the “Energy Star” label is 
increasingly used.  
As mentioned in the introduction, the main contribution of this paper is to 
examine the potential influence of suppliers on the energy efficiency gap. A 
few empirical papers also look at the supply side of energy-consuming 
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durables markets. However, their question is different as they evaluate the 
impact of a particular policy: fuel efficiency standards (Goldberg, 1998; 
Jacobsen, 2013), feebates (e.g., d’Hautfeuille et al., 2013), energy labeling 
(Houde, 2014a, 2014b), and fuel taxes (Verboven, 2002).  
Refrigerators constitute a suitable case to explore these questions for reasons 
that are best explained through a comparison with motor vehicles, for which 
the impact of gasoline prices has been studied in several recent studies (e.g., 
Allcott and Wozny, 2014; Busse et al., 2013, Anderson et al., 2013). To start 
with, and in contrast to car owners, who vary their usage intensity, refrigerator 
owners cannot adjust energy consumption after purchase. As a result, future 
energy consumption is exogenously determined by the characteristics of the 
product. This suppresses an important source of bias and measurement errors. 
A second advantage is that there is no market for used cold appliances. This is 
obviously not the case for cars, and empirical analysis therefore needs to 
develop complex solutions and/or make several assumptions to deal with this 
issue. See for instance Jacobsen (2013), Li et al. (2009) or Allcott and Wozny 
(2014). Third, the product is simple compared to cars and less influenced by 
subjective feelings. This is a major benefit, as dealing with taste shocks and 
unobserved product characteristics that tend to be correlated with energy 
performance is a major methodological obstacle, particularly when using 
market-level data, as done in this paper and many others.  
3. Conceptual framework 
In this section, we propose a framework including two components. First, a 
demand model describes consumer purchase behavior; it serves to measure the 
size of consumer myopia. Second, a price model describes the pricing 
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behavior of the suppliers; it aims to understand the impact of imperfect 
competition on the market.
6
 
3.1 Demand 
We develop a simple discrete choice demand model of the refrigerator market 
based on Berry (1994). T markets each represent the UK refrigerator market 
during year t (with t = 1,…,T). For each market, we observe aggregate 
quantities sold, average prices, and product characteristics for J refrigerator 
models.  
Consumers choose the product that maximizes utility. The indirect utility 
function of consumer i purchasing a new refrigerator j in year t is equal to  
              where     is the average utility and      is consumer i’s 
unobserved heterogeneity that captures deviation from the average. The 
average utility is:
7
 
         (        )  
In this expression,     captures the usage value of the refrigerator j over its 
lifetime which depends on product characteristics such as size and whether the 
refrigerator is built-in or freestanding.     is the purchase price and     is the 
discounted electricity cost.     has a negative impact on     which is 
proportional to  , the marginal utility of money, and a parameter  , which 
                                                 
6
 The framework described hereafter is static. A dynamic framework would be useful if our 
aim were to explain the timing of consumers’ purchase decisions, for instance like Rapson 
(2014), who uses a dynamic model to understand the adoption of energy-efficient air 
conditioning in the US, since purchase decisions can be delayed for several years. In contrast, 
the date of purchase of a new refrigerator is mostly exogenous as they are typically replaced 
immediately when they break down or when the kitchen is renovated (and renovation is not a 
consequence of the decision to purchase a new refrigerator). This is why we have chosen a 
static framework which reduces the need for instrumentation and imposes weaker 
assumptions. 
7
 This form of the indirect utility can be derived from a quasi-linear utility function, which is 
free of wealth effects. This is a reasonable assumption for refrigerators, which usually 
represent a small fraction of individual income.  
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captures consumers’ perceptions of energy costs. If consumers are perfectly 
rational, we obtain    . If they are myopic, it is expected that they 
underestimate the disutility from energy costs so that    . Estimating this 
parameter is a central objective of the paper.
8
 
Next we decompose the value of usage in two additively separable terms: 
           where     captures the time-varying component of the valuation 
of observed and unobserved product characteristics. Hence, we get: 
         (        )      
Berry (1994) generalizes McFadden’s (1973) discrete-choice demand model 
by transforming the logit model into a linear model that can be estimated with 
aggregated market data. In Berry’s framework, the probability that good j is 
purchased asymptotically corresponds to its market share at time t. Hence: 
    
 
   
∑      
, 
where     denotes product j’s market share in year t. A consumer can also 
choose the outside option, indexed 0, which represents the decision not to 
purchase a refrigerator. Normalizing the utility of the outside option      to 
zero, the market share of product j at time t can be compared with the market 
share of the outside good so that          
     In logs, this simplifies to 
  (   )    (   )     . This expression rests on the irrelevance of 
independent alternatives (IIA) assumption that leads to biased estimates in 
heterogeneous, segmented product markets.  
                                                 
8
 Here, the modeling strategy is to adopt the standard rational choice model, except that we 
include the parameter . An alternative approach would be to adopt a behavioral economics 
framework, which is used by Segerson and Tsvetanov (2014). But this will prevent the 
measurement of the energy efficiency gap, which is precisely the gap between actual behavior 
and perfect rationality. 
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To relax this assumption, we adopt a nested logit framework in which 
consumers’ idiosyncratic preferences are correlated across refrigerators within 
the same “nest” (    (         )   ), and zero otherwise.
9
 In this situation, 
Berry shows that: 
  (   )      (        )     (  ( ) )    (   )              ( ) 
where    ( )  is the market share of product   as a fraction of the total sales 
within group g that includes product j and   [   ]  is a scalar that 
parameterizes the within-nest correlations. Note that the model collapses to the 
standard logit when    .  
In our base specification, we construct product groups based on three 
dimensions that create product segmentation in the refrigerator market: a 
capacity indicator that takes the value 1 when the capacity is above the sample 
median capacity; an indicator that takes the value 1 when the appliance is a 
combined refrigerator-freezer rather than a standard refrigerator; and an 
indicator that distinguishes freestanding appliances from built-in ones. The 
final model therefore includes 8 nests (2 x 2 x 2). This choice is based on our 
belief that these three characteristics naturally divide the products into 
different segments. A consumer purchasing a combined refrigerator-freezer 
has a fundamentally different need than a consumer purchasing a standard 
refrigerator. Similarly, the choice of size is strongly influenced by family 
characteristics (size, food consumption habits, etc.) and dwelling 
characteristics, whereas built-in refrigerators are more likely to be chosen by 
consumers who are refurbishing their kitchen at the same time. In Appendix 
                                                 
9
 Goldberg (1995) and Allcott and Wozny (2014) are other examples where the nested logit 
model is used. A popular alternative is the random coefficient models. In this situation, the 
nested logit model is suitable since it allows us to eliminate unobserved quality and cost 
characteristics (such as exterior finish, electronic readouts, reliability, and automatic ice 
makers) and the outside option through first-differencing. A random coefficient approach 
requires us to quantify the outside option, which is uncertain and subject to measurement 
errors.  
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A, we run models with alternative nest structures and the results are not 
qualitatively affected by different nests.  
We now turn to the specification of the discounted lifetime electricity cost    , 
which is our variable of interest. The parameter   is inserted in Eq. (1) to 
capture potential behavioral failures. As a consequence,     should not be 
viewed as the electricity cost perceived by real consumers, but rather the cost 
they would consider if they were fully informed and rational. They would then 
calculate the net present value of the electricity cost with the standard formula: 
                                                     ∑
    
 
(   ) 
  
   
                                              ( ) 
In this equation,    is product j’s lifetime,    is the level of energy 
consumption per time period,     
 
 is the electricity price at time     that is 
forecasted at the time of purchase   and   is the discount rate. As we consider 
the behavior of a representative consumer,     
 
, which is a national average 
although actual prices can vary across locations. As a result, the variation in 
the data comes from the interaction between model-specific and time-invariant 
characteristics (i.e. lifetime and annual energy consumption) and time-varying 
electricity prices. Note also that forecasted electricity prices are unobserved as 
the data only include actual prices. They are estimated with an ARIMA model 
that is described more fully in Section 4. We come back to these issues in 
detail below. 
3.2 Supply 
In contrast to the demand equation, we adopt a reduced-form approach to 
assess the impact of imperfect competition on prices. Previous empirical 
contributions that examine supply-side issues (see the literature review above) 
generally adopt a structural approach in which multi-product manufacturers 
compete à la Bertrand. In the context of a nested logit model, Berry (1994) 
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provides the formula applicable to compute equilibrium prices under Bertrand-
Nash competition: 
                                              
   
 
     ( )  (   )   
                                       ( ) 
In this equation,     is the unit production cost of model j at time t;   and   are 
the parameters also included in the sales equation. As they can be estimated 
with the demand equation, we could use (3) to directly compute the markups 
without any additional estimation 
However, this equation is likely to convey an incorrect estimation of the 
markups. In practice, the markup values are heavily influenced by the choice 
of nest structure (the smaller the nest, the higher the markup). As we lack 
information to truly detect the real competitors of product j, the choice of nest 
structure is arbitrary and therefore could very plausibly under- or over-
estimate competition intensity.
10
 More fundamentally, the Bertrand-Nash 
setting overlooks the fact that this sector is characterized by the presence of 
complex vertical relations between manufacturers and retailers, which also sell 
refrigerators produced by other manufacturers under their own brand name. 
A reduced-form approach copes neither with the issue of vertical relations nor 
with the fact that nests may be wrongly specified, but is at least less reliant on 
the strong assumption that the real competitors of product j are truly identified. 
It thus provides a more flexible strategy to identify price margins. 
Therefore, to avoid relying on specific assumptions about the structure of 
competition, we consider that the purchase price is given by: 
                                                 
10
 If we assume no nest at all (σ=0), we find an average markup of £ 119.8 with very little 
variation across products (£ 119.7 – 120.4). With 8 nests as defined in the base model, the 
sales-weighted average markup of all products used in the simulation falls to £ 21.6. The 
lowest markup would be estimated at £ 21.4 and the highest at £ 28, with most products 
having a markup close to the minimum. 
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                                                         (      ( ) )                                              
In this equation,  ( ) is a multiplicative term which captures the size of the 
mark-up as a function of the product market shares     and   ( ) . The reader 
may note that the choice of such a functional form relates to Berry’s formula 
(3) since it includes the same determinants for the size of the markups. 
However, it is less restrictive, as it does not include the parameters   and   
that are also present in the demand equation.  The main difference with the 
structural approach is then that additional assumptions will be made at the 
simulation stage, that is, when using the econometric estimates to compute 
e.g., the size of the energy efficiency gap. This makes it easier to check 
whether they are valid, a point made by Busse, Knittel and Zettelmeyer (2013) 
for instance. In this paper, these assumptions are presented in Section 7 where 
we describe our simulations. 
Taking logs and adopting a log linear specification for  , the price equation 
becomes: 
                                                           ( )                           ( ) 
where   is a product-fixed effect influencing the level of the mark-up and 
  ( )  is the global market share of product   's nest in year  . The log-log 
functional form implies that a relative increase in market share is assumed to 
have a constant relative impact on prices. 
As mentioned above, this approach overlooks the long-run impact of imperfect 
competition and consumer myopia on product characteristics and innovation. 
In a preliminary stage of this research, we however applied a dynamic probit 
model to our data in order to estimate product entry and exit. Results are 
mostly similar to the ones obtained in the short run. The methodology and 
results obtained are available on demand. However, this supplementary 
analysis does not look at manufacturers’ capacity to reduce the cost of 
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producing energy-efficient products in the long run. In the absence of cost 
information, this question cannot be treated easily. 
4. Data  
We use market data from the refrigerator market in the UK on the product 
level from 2002 to 2007 collected by the market research company GfK Retail 
and Technology (received by the Department for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs). The data includes detailed annual information on refrigerators 
and combined refrigerator-freezers sold in the UK. We identify products by 
brand name and series numbers. If not available, we rely on available 
information on product features (width, height, total capacity, energy 
consumption, energy efficiency rating, freestanding / built-in feature, 
availability of no-frost system and of freezer). Note that products that are 
similar in all respects but have a different brand name are considered to be 
different. This is in line with the view that brand name is a product attribute 
valued by consumers for itself.
 11
 
Each observation is a product j in year t with measures including number of 
units sold, average consumer price, and annual electricity consumption. We 
also observe a set of product features such as size, whether it is a standard 
refrigerator or a combined refrigerator-freezer, and indication of whether it has 
a separate freezing compartment that can store food at -18°C. We do not have 
information on product-specific lifetimes. Instead, we use the information 
provided by the Association of Manufacturers of Domestic Appliances that 
                                                 
11
 Brand name and series numbers were not available for store brands. For these products, 
identification is based on product features alone. This means that, with this method, two 
different store brand models with exactly the same product features cannot be properly 
distinguished. Therefore, observations for store brand appliances are dropped each time the 
same product corresponds to various models of appliances for the same year. 
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estimates lifetimes of 12.8 years for refrigerators and 17.5 years for combined 
refrigerator-freezers (AMDEA, 2008).
12
 
A potential problem is that the data does not include information on energy 
efficiency policies that may have influenced market outcomes. However, there 
was no change in the design of the labeling scheme or in the strictness of the 
regulatory standards during the sample period. Admittedly, the Energy 
Efficiency Commitment (EEC) scheme was enforced during the study period, 
offering eligible households the possibility of financial support for the 
purchase of energy-efficient cold appliances. However, the measure had very 
little impact on the refrigerator market. In practice, support mostly focused on 
energy-efficient light bulbs and home insulation. Lees (2008) reports that 
fridge-freezers subsidized by EEC represented 0.43% of the market between 
2005 and 2008. If we also include subsidies from local authorities and the 
Warm Front, subsidized appliances probably represented around 1.5% of all 
cold appliances sold between 2005 and 2008. 
We drop observations with low sales. In particular, we drop models where 
annual sales never exceed 100 units over the study period. This ensures that 
the models in the sample were actually commercialized on a large scale (not 
only in a few local markets) during at least one year over the period. We also 
drop observations (product-year) with less than 10 units sold to avoid having 
models with sales near zero, which would make the estimation of the discrete 
choice model unstable. Outliers are also dropped: we identify the 2.5% of 
products with the highest and lowest prices, capacities and energy 
                                                 
12
 The assumption that all appliances of a given type have the same lifetime disregards the fact 
that some appliances may in fact have a longer/shorter expected lifetime. However, if 
consumer expectations about lifetimes are constant over time, these cross-sectional differences 
between appliances will be resolved when using either fixed effects or first differences to 
estimate our econometric models. We furthermore show in the Appendix that changing the 
lifetime of appliances when calculating operating costs has limited impacts on the estimated 
parameters. This is because, on average, appliances have a long lifetime compared to the 
implicit discount rate applied by consumers. 
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consumptions, in addition to the 2.5% of products with the highest sales 
levels. Any product falling within at least one of these categories is dropped 
from the sample.
13
 
Summary statistics on product characteristics are displayed in Table 1. The 
data set used in the regressions includes 3,519 observations of which 2,265 are 
used to construct the first differences for the econometric estimation of the 
demand equation. The total number of differences used in the econometric 
estimation is then 1,365. Descriptive statistics are based on the 2,265 
observations used to construct the differences of the estimation sample of the 
market share equation. Most appliances are larder fridges and fridge-freezers. 
Although the data is not used in our estimation, we also know the product’s 
classification according to the EU energy label. Energy labeling has been 
mandatory since 1995 for all refrigerators sold in the European Union. In our 
data, each product is assigned to a class from A++ (the most energy efficient) 
to G (the least energy efficient). This rating does not capture the absolute 
energy consumption of the appliance, but its relative consumption across 
different classes. Table 2 provides an overview of the distribution of prices 
and market shares across energy efficiency classes. Note that almost all 
products were rated A, B or C during the study period. 
 
  
                                                 
13
 Outliers in terms of price, capacity, energy consumption and sales are excluded for several 
reasons. First, the data is reported to GfK and some observations appear to have been 
miscoded. We want to remove from the data observations with absurd values. Second, we 
exclude niche products, since they would not properly belong to the nests we have defined. 
We also exclude best sellers because we do not observe commercialization strategies that can 
be correlated with prices or energy efficiency and fear that these products have access to a 
much wider web of providers than other goods. Tests have been run to check that our results 
were not heavily dependent on how the sample was restricted. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics on product characteristics 
Variable Unit Mean 
Std 
deviation 
Annual sales, used for the log of market 
shares   (    ) 
# of units 1371.5 2251.6 
Purchase price,      real £ 394 246.7 
Appliance lifetime,    years 15.2  
Energy consumption,    kWh/year 306.3 136.5 
Height cm 139.8 42.8 
Width cm 59.3 9 
Capacity liters 246.9 106.5 
Energy efficiency rating
a
  2.4 0.8 
Share of combined refrigerators-freezers  0.51  
Share of built-in appliances  0.74  
Share of appliances with no-frost system  0.23  
Notes. Source: GfK, provided by Defra. Survey years: 2002-2007. 2,265 
observations. 
a
 To obtain a numeric value for the energy efficiency rating (from “G” 
to “A++”), ratings were recoded with “A++” set equal to 0, “A+”=1, “A”=2 and so 
on up to “E”=6. The data used in the regression does not comprise “F” and “G” 
labeled products. 
Table 2: Sales-weighted price and market share of appliances, 
breakdowns by energy efficiency class 
Energy efficiency rating Sales-weighted average price Market share 
A++ 392.3 0.03% 
A+ 294 3.38% 
A 324.7 57.87% 
B 267.3 25.82% 
C 237.2 12.43% 
D 313.6 0.48% 
E 257 0.01% 
Notes. Source: GfK, made available by Defra. Survey years: 2002-2007. 2,265 
observations. No observation with energy efficiency rating of “F” or “G”. 
The data also suggest the degree of imperfect competition prevalent in the 
market. Restricting to 2007 for simplicity, the refrigerator market was 
composed of 66 manufacturer brands, selling an average of 25 different 
products each. A few brands concentrated most of the sales: the top 5 and top 
10 manufacturers respectively commercialized 48% and 68% of all the 
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products sold in that year. However, market shares of these top manufacturers 
have a similar size, none of them exceeding 20%. As a result, the Hirschman-
Herfindhal Index (HHI) was around 770 at the global 2007 level, which does 
not suggest strong market power. 
These numbers however ignore the existence of product differentiation. 
Refrigerators have radically different sizes and energy efficiency levels. They 
can also include specific features, such as water and ice dispensers or free-
frost technology to make maintenance easier. Some consumers buy built-in 
appliances to fit better in their kitchen whereas others opt for freestanding 
appliances, etc. As a result, a given product actually has a fairly limited 
number of direct competitors. We thus need to reassess the degree of 
imperfect competition by calculating HHI for specific market segments. For 
example, consider eight market segments of refrigerators or refrigerator-
freezers, that are either built-in or freestanding and either above or below the 
median size. The HHI lies above 1,500 (moderate concentration) in 3 cases out 
of 8. If we further breakdown the market based on the energy efficiency rating 
of appliances, this produces a total of 37 sub-segments of refrigerators or 
refrigerator-freezers that are either built-in or freestanding, of a comparable 
size and with the same energy efficiency rating. The HHI is above 2,500 (high 
concentration) in 23 of these sub-segments. 
We now explain how we derive the electricity cost variable from the data. 
Recall that: 
        ∑
    
 
(   ) 
  
   
  
As indicated earlier,     should be viewed as the valuation of cost by a 
sophisticated and informed decision-maker. This hypothetical consumer 
knows the annual energy consumption (  ) and lifetime (  ) of each model 
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available on the market. He considers the opportunity cost of capital when 
determining the appropriate discount rate. 
Choosing the value of   is critical as it directly influences  , and thus the 
importance of consumer myopia. Consider first a consumer who purchases a 
refrigerator from her/his savings. The opportunity cost is then related to the 
return that could be made on these savings. More precisely, the discount rate   
should equal the real average bond deposit rate of UK households (2.83% 
according to the Bank of England for the period 2002-2007). Consider then a 
consumer who buys on credit. Now her/his opportunity cost corresponds to the 
average interest rate. A possible reference is the rate of credit card lending 
(13.98% according to the Bank of England for the period 2002-2007). 
Accordingly, the discount rate to be applied should be a weighted average of 
both these rates where weights equal the share of both types of consumers. In 
this study, we use statistics on method of payment for furniture available in the 
UK food and expenditure survey. In 2007, 2.06% of respondents who 
purchased furniture used a loan, 1.98% hired their product, 11.90% used a 
credit card and the remaining 84.06% used cash or another method of 
payment.
14
 Assuming the same patterns for refrigerators - products present 
similarities, in particular, similar average prices, we have considered that the 
proportion of consumers likely to use a credit card loan or a similar type of 
loan for the purchase of a refrigerator is around 16%. Using this weight, we 
find a discount rate r equal  to 4.6%. 
Measuring the forecasted electricity price     
 
 is more problematic as we only 
observe real electricity prices. Furthermore, there was a drastic surge in 
electricity prices in the UK over the period, implying that observed and 
expected electricity prices could very well differ. As a benchmark, we 
                                                 
14
 The survey does not describe these other methods, which would include, to our 
understanding, debit cards and cheques. 
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consider that a perfectly rational consumer calculates future electricity prices 
based on the entire series of past prices. We approximate this calculation 
process by an autoregressive integrated moving-average model (ARIMA) on 
monthly data of real electricity prices. This technique allows us to recreate the 
entire flow of future expected electricity prices that enter Eq. (2). The best fit 
with our data is obtained with an ARIMA process with one lag for the 
autoregressive term and one lag for the moving-average term: 
                    
where  ,   and   are parameters and    is the error term at time t. The model 
is used recurrently to make forecasts, using predictions of the previous periods 
to calculate new predictions. We re-estimate this model for each year to allow 
decision-makers to use all of the data that are observed at each time period. 
This implies that the model is updated each year based on previous market 
data; e.g. the price expectations for consumers in 2003 are based on prices up 
until Dec. 2002). We then calculate the forecasted prices as: 
                                           
   ̂   ̂       
                                                          ( ) 
where  ̂  and  ̂  are estimates of   and   using all the data available on 
electricity prices up to time t. The detailed results of the ARIMA models are in 
Appendix C.  
In online Appendix M, we also develop an alternative approach in which 
forecasts are derived from the futures prices in the wholesale electricity 
market. The intuition for this approach is that the futures market aggregate 
information on future prices initially owned by sophisticated market 
participants. These results are similar to the ones we obtain when using the 
ARIMA model. Another alternative would be to proxy the forecasted 
electricity price by its current price. In a recent paper, Anderson et al. (2013) 
show that US consumers tend to believe that gasoline prices follow a random 
walk, so that the current price is a martingale. However, this approach is not 
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consistent with the assumption we make, since we do not want     to capture 
real-world expectations, but rather to describe cost valuation by a 
sophisticated decision-maker so that the parameter   only captures the size of 
the deviation from this benchmark.
15
  
Figure 1 presents the real monthly electricity price data, which is calculated 
using data on retail electricity prices from the Department of Energy and 
Climate Change (DECC, 2013a).  
Figure 1: Average monthly electricity prices in the UK, 1996-2014 
 
Note: Prices in pence per kWh with CPI=1 in 2005. The study period is between the 
two vertical lines. 
 
Note also that the study period 2002-2007 is marked by a dramatic rise in the 
electricity price driven by increasing gas prices (about 8% per year) after a 
period of decreases pre-2002. Consequently, forecasts are consistently below 
actual prices during the period, i.e. an error that decreases the size of  . 
                                                 
15
 We do, however, provide the results under this assumption in online Appendix M as a test 
of robustness. This leads to an increase of the size of γ (and thus reduces myopia). 
8
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5. Estimation 
In this section, we specify the different equations and discuss identification 
issues. 
5.1 Demand 
To derive an econometric specification for short-term sales, we first add year 
dummies    to eq. (1) to eliminate the share of the outside option and any shift 
in the overall market share level. Next we take the first-difference in order to 
eliminate the value of usage.
16
 This leads to: 
                (   )    (          )      (  ( ) )                   ( ) 
where   is the first-difference operator and     is the econometric error term 
capturing unobserved time- and product-varying heterogeneity. 
A concern with Eq. (6) is that the purchase price     is endogenous since 
quantities and prices are simultaneously determined in market equilibrium. 
The origin of this problem is that unobserved time-varying product 
characteristics affect both consumers’ product valuation and prices, i.e. 
 [  ]   . The log of the within-nest market share   (  ( ) )  is also 
endogenous. A higher value of   increases the sales of refrigerator   and 
because this product belongs to nest  , an increase in     mechanically 
increases   ( ) . An instrumental variable approach is therefore adopted. 
Another reason for doing so is to circumvent potential measurement errors in 
the price variable since we do not observe transaction prices but a national 
                                                 
16
 We use first-differencing instead of demeaning since this allows us to directly estimate  and  
in a non-linear GMM estimation. A first-differencing is only efficient when there is no serial 
correlation. When testing for serial correlation in the first-differenced model using a 
Wooldridge test, we find evidence of serial correlation. We account for serial correlation in 
the estimation of the standard errors using clustered robust standard errors at the product level. 
A fixed effect specification in level is displayed in online Appendix I. The estimated 
coefficients in the first-differenced and fixed effects models are comparable in size and not 
statistically different from each other. 
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average transaction price calculated by GfK.
17
 Applying a valid instrument on 
prices addresses de facto the attenuation bias caused by measurement errors. 
A common instrumentation approach in industrial organization is to take 
advantage of the fact that the market is imperfectly competitive. In such 
situations it is claimed that non-price characteristics of products     
influence     but not the utility    . Berry (1994) suggests using the nest 
structure of the model. His proposed instruments are the averages for different 
product features within and/or out of the nest that product j belongs to. This 
approach is extended in Berry et al. (1995) and has been adopted in many 
studies. 
A weakness of this strategy is that taste shocks that affect other products can 
also influence the utility of product  . For instance, marketing efforts by a firm 
can induce a taste shock that affects all of its products, or given characteristics 
that concern several models might become popular among consumers. The 
fact that refrigerators are quite standardized products, except in the dimensions 
we base the nests on, is not necessarily advantageous when instrumenting with 
other products’ characteristics. This means that unobserved product 
characteristics are likely to be correlated across nests and manufacturers. 
Significant standardization also implies that product characteristics may not 
evolve sharply over time and therefore that within and outside nest averages 
they may remain stable from one year to the next, reducing the strength of 
potential instruments. We indeed find that when we use instruments of this 
type, they are weak (shown in online Appendix L).  
This leads us to adopt an alternative approach where instruments are related to 
the price of products sold in two related markets: the upright freezer market 
(i.e. excluding the chest freezer market) and the washing machine market. 
                                                 
17
 This problem is likely to be less severe than in the automobile market, where list prices can 
widely diverge from the prices that are actually paid after commercial negotiations.   
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Freezers and washing machines present two useful characteristics. First, they 
are sold outside the refrigerator market, and thus to different consumers. This 
implies that taste shocks are less likely to be correlated with those observed in 
the refrigerator market. Second, they share some technical similarities with 
refrigerators as they are all large household appliances. This means that shocks 
affecting production costs – e.g., an increase in steel prices – are likely to be 
correlated across these markets. The prices of freezers and washing machines 
are therefore likely to be correlated with cost shocks in the refrigerator market. 
This approach presents some similarities with the strategy implemented by 
Hausman et al. (1994), which uses prices of the same product in other regions 
(and thus in different markets) as instruments. We use the price of similar 
products in other markets. The common identification assumption is that 
prices in outside markets reflect underlying product costs and stochastic 
market-specific factors that are independent from those observed in the fridge 
markets. 
The difficulty with this approach is to match outside prices to the price of a 
specific refrigerator, as goods are different. Our solution is to use two product 
characteristics that are common to refrigerators, freezers, and washing 
machines, i.e. capacity and whether the appliance is built-in or freestanding. 
Using a hedonic pricing model, we estimate a year-specific implicit price for 
these two characteristics on product-level data for the UK freezer and washing 
machine markets between 2002 and 2007 obtained from GfK. This gives a 
year-specific average for subcategories of freezers and washing machines, 
which we match with the same subcategories of refrigerators-freezers and 
refrigerators. For example, the implicit price of smaller than average built-in 
freezers at time t is used as an instrument for the price of smaller than average, 
built-in refrigerators and refrigerator-freezers at time t. Importantly, we 
include brand-specific time trends in the hedonic pricing model in order to 
control for changes in brand-specific marketing strategies and image. This 
ensures that variations in the hedonic prices of the two characteristics do not 
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capture changes in brand image, which could be correlated with the sales of 
refrigerators with the same brand name. To ensure that our estimation is not 
biased by changes in the retail sector, trade brand products have been 
withdrawn from the sample used to estimate the implicit price of the two 
attributes. All the details of how these instruments are constructed are included 
in Appendix B. 
As previously evoked, another issue is that, as data on refrigerators are only 
available at the national level, we use the national average electricity price to 
compute    . This potentially creates a measurement problem, as the price of 
electricity may be different across regions. However, regional price 
heterogeneity is likely to be modest. In 2013, statistics show that regional 
differences are within ±5% of the national average, except for Northern 
Ireland where less than 3% of the UK population resides. Measurement errors 
may also arise for two other reasons. First, we have averaged the interest rate 
on credit card loans and the deposit rate for fixed bound deposits to compute 
the discount rate. Second, consumer heterogeneity (e.g. in terms of 
environmental awareness) may lead some consumers to prefer energy-efficient 
appliances. The sorting of consumers across products (as in Bento, Li and 
Roth, 2012) would imply that product-specific energy costs are measured with 
errors and thus endogenous. In Appendix E, we give results with a 
specification whereby the operating cost is instrumented with its lagged values 
to control for all potential measurement problems. We find small differences. 
A final issue is that we only have access to the average UK electricity prices, 
whereas perfectly rational consumers are unlikely to care about average prices, 
but only consider marginal prices. The results of our base model are not biased 
provided that the level of the fixed part of the tariff did not change between 
2002 and 2007, which is plausible as the rise was driven by gas price increases 
that raised the (variable) cost of electricity generation. However, in Appendix 
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D we run a robustness test where we assume that the share (not the level) of 
the fixed part remains stable. This slightly inflates the size of  .   
5.2 Supply 
For convenience, we rewrite Eq. (4) here 
                                                             ( )                          
To deal with the problem that the production cost is not observed, we assume 
that            ( )    ( )       where    is a product fixed effect, 
  ( ) , a by-brand by-year fixed effects, and   ( ) , a by-year by-nest fixed 
effect.     captures time-varying shocks on the production cost. Introducing 
these different fixed effects will absorb the terms        and  . As a result, 
and slightly abusing notations, the price equation is now: 
                         (   )       ( )    ( )     (   )                           ( ) 
The multiple fixed effects allow controlling for most unobserved factors that 
influence cost. However, there is a price to be paid: It is not possible to 
estimate the value of   and   econometrically, and thus to directly infer the 
size of the markup from these estimates. When performing the simulations, we 
therefore bypass the obstacle using external information on average markups 
in the UK cold appliance industry.  
Obviously,   (   ) is endogenous in Eq. (7) for the same reason that     was 
endogenous in the sales equation. But we now need an instrument that is 
correlated with demand shocks but uncorrelated with costs. Our strategy relies 
on a well-known effect in the marketing field, i.e. the “compromise effect” 
(Drolet, Simonson and Tversky, 2002) or “extremeness aversion” (Simonson 
and Tversky, 1992). This says that demand for differentiated goods is affected 
in a way that is unrelated to product quality in absolute terms. For example, 
when faced with three differentiated products with ordered product 
characteristics, consumers tend to purchase the product with average 
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characteristics. The surprising element is that the characteristics of the average 
product matter less than its position in the “middle” of all products. This effect 
has been validated in a wide variety of experimental settings (e.g. Müller et 
al., 2012). 
The distance to the average product can then serve as an instrument because it 
affects demand, but is not systematically correlated with production costs. To 
explain why, let us first define the instrument. We use the height of the 
refrigerator and calculate the average distance for all products in a given nest 
and year. This average changes over time because new products are launched 
and others are withdrawn. The instrument is then equal to the squared value of 
the difference between this average and product j’s height. We expect this 
instrument to be relevant because consumers, if averse to extremes, will favor 
products whose height is close to the within-nest average.
 
Using height as a 
product feature to construct our instrument is justified by two reasons. First, it 
is a very visible product feature that allows for direct and immediate aesthetic 
comparison in retail shops. Second, height is not binding, as all refrigerators 
are below standard ceiling height (2.4 meters). This leads to significant 
variation across models, in contrast with width and depth, which vary less in 
order to correspond to all kitchen sizes.
18
 
The exogeneity condition imposes that our instrument should not be correlated 
with unexplained supply shocks (i.e. cost shifters) present in the error term. 
Justifying exogeneity requires detailed explanations. To start with, note that 
variation is generated by changes in other products' height. One could argue 
that non-price characteristics of other products are exogenous because they are 
selected before the pricing decision. This first argument is, however, partly 
                                                 
18
 Height is a non-binding attribute because our sample includes a majority of larder fridges 
and fridge-freezers which are rarely put under a cabinet. As a result, there is significant 
within-nest variation in height across models. This variation plays an important role in 
guaranteeing the strength of our instrument (as described hereafter in the results section with 
standard statistical tests). 
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convincing for reasons similar to those put forward when justifying the IV 
strategy for the demand equation in subsection 5.1. Like taste shocks, time-
varying changes in production costs can be correlated across products, and 
height obviously influences the production cost – a higher refrigerator is likely 
to be more costly to manufacture. This problem is, however, mitigated by the 
absence of a systematic relationship between this increase and the squared 
difference in absolute terms between the height and the within-nest average. 
Imagine for instance a downward shock on product j's distance from the 
average height, which thus increases demand. If the product is higher than 
average, this means that the average height has increased (because of the 
launch of higher-than-average products and/or the withdrawal of lower ones). 
This shock can be correlated with a change in the production cost, which 
makes the production of high refrigerators less expensive (e.g. a decrease in 
steel prices). However, the same change in the production cost will have the 
opposite impact on our instrument if product j is smaller than average. That is, 
the distance to the average will increase. The point is that there is no 
systematic correlation with the costs. 
In addition, the inclusion of stringent controls reduces the risk of not meeting 
the exogeneity restriction. Since our instrument evolves with the average 
height of products within a nest, it could possibly be correlated with their 
marginal cost. However, by-nest by-year fixed effects have been included in 
the regression to extract such correlation from the error term. Likewise, 
distance to average height could also reflect a specific positioning of firms, 
and therefore be correlated with firm-specific characteristics. We make sure 
that this correlation between the instrument and the marginal cost is extracted 
from the error term by introducing by-brand by-year fixed effects. 
Last, to secure our strategy, we account for the possibility that the error term 
includes time-varying effects of height on production costs:       ̅    (  ) 
where    is the height of product j. We then proxy   (  ) using quadratic 
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interaction terms between height and time. This set of additional controls is a 
sufficient statistic for ensuring that the instrument is not correlated with   ̅ .
19
 
The final equation estimated is: 
   (   )   
         ( )    ( )     (   )     (                 )    ̅      ( ) 
The coefficient of interest is  , which we will interpret as the impact of market 
power on product prices. This interpretation relies upon the assumption that 
marginal costs do not depend on    , a common assumption in studies on 
empirical industrial organization  (e.g. Berry, 1994). This may be challenged 
even though Eq. (8) is a flexible specification for marginal costs, which 
includes by-firm, by-year fixed effects. One could argue for instance that 
production costs could in fact be correlated with     due to learning-by-doing: 
sustained sales will allow manufacturers to gradually improve their processes, 
thus reducing production costs. However, learning-by-doing is driven by 
cumulative sales, not by annual sales. For this to happen, a correlation will 
need to exist between     and cumulative sales. This correlation is arguably 
weak for two reasons. First, the plants that manufacture refrigerators sold in 
the UK typically produce for other markets. Second, low sales levels can 
either correspond to a product launch or a product’s end of life. The 
relationship between annual sales at time t and cumulative production is thus 
typically non-monotonic. 
                                                 
19
 The stringency of the set of controls can be increased by introducing fully interacted fixed 
effects: by-nest by-brand by-year fixed effects. Hence we would control for firm positioning 
within each nest and at each time period. This is done in Appendix H. Results lose some 
precision but are unchanged. Another possibility, also reported in Appendix H, is to introduce 
nest-specific or brand-specific quadratic trends for the correlation between height and time, 
which could be different for each nest or brand. Likewise, results are quite similar in 
magnitude. 
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6. Results  
Sales 
Table 3 reports estimation results of Eq. (6). As there is an interaction between 
  and  , we use a GMM estimator.20 The value of   (0.89 and significant at 
1% level) indicates that the within-nest correlation is substantial. Additionally, 
the coefficient for the valuation of money has the expected sign and is 
significantly different from zero.  
The main result in Table 3 is that       , which implies that consumers 
underestimate energy costs by 35%. Importantly, the 95% confidence interval 
for   is 0.36 – 0.95. Hence the estimate of the attention parameter is both 
statistically different from 0 and 1. Consumers still take a large share (65%) of 
future discounted operating costs into consideration when purchasing a 
refrigerator. This is more explicit if we compute the “implicit” discount rate 
that would rationalize consumer behavior. That is, the value of r necessary to 
obtain a value of   equal to one. We show in online Appendix J that the 
implicit discount rate is 11%. Therefore, consumers behave as if they used a 
discount rate of 11% to compute the net present value of electricity cost, 
which is arguably a moderate distance from the average discount rate of 4.6% 
used as a benchmark. However, due to the long lifetime of cold appliances, 
this leads to a relatively large underestimation of energy costs.
21
 
 
                                                 
20
 The standard empirical approach is to separately estimate the coefficients for the price and 
the energy costs in a linear setting, and deduce the values of α and γ. We include the results 
obtained with the standard linear approach as a robustness test in online Appendix I along 
with standard tests of the validity of instruments. 
21
 The longer the lifetime, the smaller the value of  for a given implicit discount rate. For the 
reader interested in comparing estimates of consumer myopia across various studies, the 
parameter of reference is therefore the implicit discount rate and not the value of  since it is 
influenced by the lifetime of the product under study. 
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Table 3: First difference IV-GMM estimation results for the sales 
equation 
Dependent variable Logarithm of market share of product j 
Importance of total electricity 
costs (γ) 
0.6538*** 
(4.32) 
Utility for money (α) 0.0052*** 
(3.51) 
Within-group correlation of error 
term (σ) for the demand equation 
0.8889*** 
(16.14) 
Year dummies Yes 
Observations 1,365 
Notes. Two instruments are used. They correspond to the fixed effects capturing 
year-by-year changes in the price of upright freezers and washing machines. The 
nests on which σ is calculated distinguish refrigerators from combined refrigerator-
freezers, built-in from freestanding appliances, and appliances by capacity (over and 
below the sample median). t-statistics are in brackets. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and clustered on products. Results marked with *, ** and *** are 
statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
This implicit discount rate is low when compared with the earlier literature on 
refrigerators, which found implicit discount rates above 30% (the only 
exception being Tsvetanov and Segerson, 2014). As outlined above, there are 
two likely explanations. The first is that previous estimations use older data. 
Since then, investment inefficiencies may have decreased because consumers 
are better informed: energy labeling has been mandatory for refrigerators since 
1995 in the European Union. This is in line with the views expressed by many 
observers who consider that the EU Energy Label has been very successful in 
reducing the information gap about energy efficiency (see for example Atkins 
and ECN, 2006). The second explanation is methodological. We use panel 
data techniques that better control for unobserved product differences. In this 
respect, when we use a hedonic pricing model on a cross section of models, 
i.e. the approach popularized by Hausman (1979), we find a discount rate of 
210% (detailed results provided in online Appendix K). As argued in Section 
2, recent studies that rely on panel data tend to find rates of similar 
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magnitude.
22
 The direction of the bias suggests that unobserved quality is 
negatively correlated with energy use. This is arguably the case in the 
refrigerator market in which, for a given size class – the hedonic equation 
includes controls for size, height, and width, energy efficient refrigerators are 
also more reliable, use better material, exhibit a more sophisticated design and 
electronic readout. 
The average effect obtained with this base specification is robust to changes in 
the parameters used to calibrate the GMM model: the sensitivity analysis with 
different values of product lifetimes, electricity prices and nest structures are 
presented in Appendices (A, D and E) and show little differences in the 
magnitude of the implicit discount rate. For example, assuming a standard 
logit model with no nest leads to a value of   around 0.72.23 
Prices 
Estimation results are shown in Table 4. We use two-stage least squares and 
cluster-robust standard errors to estimate the price equation. As expected, 
suppliers adapt prices to shifts in demand: when the market share of an 
appliance increases by 10%, its price increases by around 0.6%. This effect is 
statistically significant and of reasonable magnitude.  
The relevance of the instrument is suggested by the high Kleibergen-Paap rk 
Wald F statistic. The output of the first stage is also reported in Table 4. The 
                                                 
22
 Tsvetanov and Segerson (2014) find slightly higher rates for refrigerators (13-22%), but 
they use a cross section of US households. 
23
 The reader may notice that our specification assumes that γ  is constant across the study 
period. It is possible that consumers’ attention to energy costs increases with the price of 
electricity. We ran regressions to test whether γ  increased in line with the price of electricity. 
However, results were not conclusive because the panel is short. 
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negative correlation with the logarithm of the market share and our instrument 
confirms the idea that consumers might be averse to extremes.
24
 
Table 4: Fixed effects 2SLS Estimation results for the price equation 
Dependent variable Log. price of product j 
Markup,   0.0627** 
(2.56) 
Year x brand dummies Yes 
Year x nest dummies Yes 
Product fixed effects Yes 
First stage results    
Square of distance to mean height within 
the nest 
-0.0008*** 
(-5.44) 
Weak identification test   
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic  29.64 
Max. IV bias <10% 
Observations 2,421 
Notes. t-statistics are in brackets. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and 
clustered on products. Results marked with *, ** and *** are statistically significant 
at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
7. Counterfactual simulations  
In this section, we perform simulations to quantify the impact of the two 
identified market imperfections on energy consumption and consumer surplus. 
We analyze three counterfactual scenarios and compare against the “business-
as-usual” situation observed in the data: I) consumers are non-myopic but the 
market is imperfectly competitive; II) consumers are myopic but the market is 
perfectly competitive; and III) consumers are non-myopic and the market is 
perfectly competitive. 
Removing myopia in scenarios I and III amounts to substituting the estimates 
of the attention parameter γ̂  (equal to 0.65) by 1. Simulating perfect 
competition in scenarios II and III is more complex. In a competitive market, 
                                                 
24
 We also run an over-identified model using, as an additional instrument, the squared value 
of our instrument. We also run an over-identification test. The Sargan over-identification test 
confirms the validity of the instruments.  
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product prices equal marginal costs (       ). Given Eq. (3), this would 
amount to substituting       by: 
                                ( ̂   ̂        ̂     ( ) )                         
where ̂  ,  ̂  and  ̂ are estimated parameters. The problem is that we do not 
know ̂   and  ̂ which have been absorbed by the various fixed effects.
 
Our 
solution involves calibrating markups for individual products based on  ̂ and 
external information on the average markup prevailing in the corresponding 
UK manufacturing and retail markets. That is, we substitute       by       
( ̅   ̂      ) where ̅  is such that the sales-weighted mean of ( ̅   ̂      ) 
is equal to the average mark-up on the market.  This leads us to treat all 
products as if the size of the nest did not matter. This approximation is not too 
much of a concern. For large nests, competition is high and therefore the 
within-nest market share should have a low influence on the markup. These 
larger nests represent most of the market (in 2007, the 4 largest nests 
represented 82% of the market). Our approximation may wrongly estimate the 
markups in smaller nests, even though, within each nest, the ranking of the 
markups is properly estimated, implying that we can correctly identify, within 
each nest, which products have the highest markups. We have checked that 
this issue did not create strong distortion by estimating the impacts of the 
simulation while considering only the 4 largest nests. The results obtained in 
this case were very similar to those obtained when considering all nests. 
The average markup is estimated with the method introduced by Roeger 
(1995) and adapted to firm-level data by Görg and Warzynski (2006). This 
approach allows us to estimate average markups prevailing in a sector based 
on standard financial data. In practice, we extract financial data from ORBIS 
on a large sample of UK firms that manufacture electric appliances or sell 
these goods and obtain an estimated average of 19.6% for the manufacturing 
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and retail of electric appliances in the UK.
25
 This markup includes both the 
markup of manufacturers (8.6%) and retailers (11%). Its value is in line with 
other studies (for instance, see Görg and Warzynski, 2006). Methodological 
details on Roeger's approach and estimation tables are provided in Appendix 
(F). In addition, we perform robustness checks (G) by considering values of 
mark-ups equal to the limits of the 95% confidence interval (9.9%-29.3%). 
Simulation results are of similar magnitude. 
We also assume that the total amount of sold appliances is the same under all 
scenarios.
26
 This is not unrealistic since purchases of refrigerators are mostly 
replacements; hence the number of sales is unlikely to be affected by the 
increase in electricity prices because the refrigerator market is saturated. 
However, increases in electricity prices could temporarily trigger additional 
purchases by consumers who possess relatively energy-inefficient products 
and therefore want to replace them: this transitional effect is not taken into 
account in these simulations.  
Impact on energy use  
To compute energy consumption in the three scenarios, we first use the 
estimates of the sales and price equations to predict product j’s market shares 
    and price     in the simulated equilibria. Taking the example of scenario I, 
we set γ    in the demand equation and first calculate the corresponding 
demand holding the price fixed. To account for price adjustments, we then 
update prices after the demand change and then recalculate market shares 
recurrently until a new equilibrium is reached.
 
Based on the market shares 
estimated for each product and each scenario, we calculate a market average 
                                                 
25
  
26
 Our model cannot predict the evolution of the outside goods market share as it is absorbed 
by the time dummies. Therefore, it is not possible to determine how the total amount of sold 
appliances would evolve. 
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for the energy consumption of sold appliances and compare it to the business-
as-usual scenario. 
Energy consumption levels in each scenario are presented in Table 6, along 
with appliance capacity and the energy consumption of the appliance per liter 
of capacity. The key finding is that the two market imperfections have 
opposite impacts on energy use. As expected, myopia increases energy use. 
Further, our expectation is that myopia is moderate. Table 6 confirms this: 
maintaining other factors constant, the sales-weighted average energy 
consumption of a sold refrigerator increases from 281.6 kWh/year to 310.2 
kWh/year. This corresponds to a 9.2% increase. In contrast, imperfect 
competition reduces energy use by 4.2%. The reason is that larger appliances 
(which consume more energy) have higher markups on average. Suppliers 
thus have more latitude to raise their price under imperfect competition, which 
reduces demand.  
As the two failures exert opposite influences on energy use, the market yields 
a level of energy performance that is only slightly higher than the level that 
would be observed in a perfectly competitive market with fully rational 
consumers (+7.2%, 310 kWh/year versus 288.0 kWh/year). All in all, these 
simulations suggest that the business-as-usual energy consumption level is not 
far from a perfectly competitive market with fully rational consumers.  
Table 6: Simulated impacts of myopia and imperfect competition on the 
energy consumption of sold appliances 
 
Energy 
consumption 
(kWh/year) 
Appliance 
capacity 
(litres) 
Energy cons-
umption per litre 
(kWh/year/litre) 
Observed situation 310.2 235.2 1.32 
Non-myopic 
consumers 
281.6 219.0 1.29 
Perfect competition 
(zero mark-ups) 
323.4 247.8 1.31 
Perfect competition 
and non-myopic 
288.0 225.7 1.28 
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consumers 
Interestingly, the main margin of adaptation for consumers to reduce energy 
consumption seems to be appliance size, and not appliance energy efficiency. 
When consumer myopia is withdrawn, energy consumption per year and per 
liter of capacity decreases by around 2.2%, whereas appliance capacity 
concomitantly decreases by 6.9%. Likewise, a reduction in appliance price 
caused by imperfect competition increases appliance size (by 5.4%), but only 
slightly improves energy efficiency (by 0.8%). 
This pattern is likely to be true in other durable goods markets in which 
competition is usually more intense for smaller products. In particular, the fact 
that larger durable products, which use more energy, have higher markups is 
likely to be true in the automobile market as shown by Berry, Levinsohn and 
Pakes (1995, see Table V p. 879) who have estimated lower elasticities for 
larger, energy-consuming cars.  
We are not aware of any study providing demand elasticity estimates as a 
function of energy consumption for other energy-using consumer durables. 
However, we have access to GfK data on the UK market for washing 
machines and dishwashers that are equivalent to the data on refrigerators used 
in the study. Running a simple OLS univariate regression (see the results 
below in Table 7), we find a statistically significant positive correlation 
between sales and energy consumption for washing machines. We do not find 
significant results for dishwashers. Incidentally, Galarraga et al. (2011) find 
that demand for dishwashers bearing energy labels signaling greater energy 
efficiency is more price elastic than demand for non-labeled products. The 
estimation however controls for size, which obviously influences energy 
consumption.  
Ultimately, it seems difficult to conclude that demand elasticity is always 
positively correlated with the level of energy use for all consumer durables. 
This justifies the need to conduct similar analyses in other markets. 
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Tableau 7: The correlation between energy consumption and sales for 
washing machines and dishwashers in the UK 
Product type Annual energy consumption
†
 Data coverage 
Washing machines +473** (2.16) 2002-2007 
Dishwashers -167 (0.29) 2006 
†
: the coefficient for an additional unit of annual energy consumption on sales. This is 
obtained by regressing the energy consumption variable on sales in a linear 
regression. The regression for washing machines includes time dummies to account 
for changes in the average energy efficiency of products over time. We do not include 
these dummies for dishwashers because we have only one time period. T-statistics in 
brackets. 
Impact on consumer surplus, profits and social welfare 
Assuming that the externalities from energy consumption are already 
internalized in the electricity price, social welfare is the sum of consumer 
surplus and profits. Profits can easily be computed as the product of sales and 
markups under the assumption that product j's unit production cost does not 
change across scenarios. The average consumer surplus is obtained using the 
formula in Small and Rosen (1981) adapted to the nested logit framework by 
Alcott and Wozny (2011): 
   
 
 
  [∑[∑    (
   
   
)
 ( )
]
   
 
]    
where   is a constant. Importantly, this formula is based on the utility     that 
is perceived by consumers. When consumers are myopic, the surplus actually 
experienced by consumers is below CS because of the unforeseen energy 
costs. On average, these are equal to: 
 
 
∑∑   (   )   
  
 
Under myopia, we adopt a paternalistic view to calculate social welfare and 
adjust the consumer surplus to account for unforeseen energy costs (see 
Allcott and Wozny, 2011, for a discussion). 
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The parameters   and   have been econometrically estimated. The value of   
is irrelevant as we are interested in the difference in consumer surplus with the 
BAU scenario. We thus just need to make an assumption on the market share 
of the outside good.    is assumed to be equal to the share of UK households 
that do not possess a refrigerator or a refrigerator-freezer, estimated at 1% by 
BRE (2013).  
Simulation results are displayed in Table 7. Withdrawing either imperfect 
competition or consumer myopia obviously increases consumer surplus. But 
the impact is relatively modest: an increase of £65 for shifting to perfect 
competition and £23 for removing myopia (respectively around 22% and 7.5% 
of the purchase price of sold products). The impact on social welfare is much 
smaller because most of the gain in the consumer surplus is a transfer from 
suppliers. In particular, the first best scenario with no imperfections only 
improves social welfare by £18.10 relative to the business-as-usual scenario. 
This corresponds to 6.1% of the average refrigerator price. 
 
Table 7: Welfare impacts of myopia and imperfect competition for an 
average sale (2005 £) 
Welfare impacts * Consumer surplus  Profit Social welfare 
Withdrawing myopia +22.9 -12.8 +10.1 
Shifting to perfect 
competition 
+66.6 -58.1 +8.5 
Both +76.2 -58.1 +18.1 
* When myopia prevails, we have subtracted unforeseen energy costs from the 
consumer surplus. The sales-weighted average price of products included in the 
welfare evaluation is £296. Since profits are null under perfect competition, the profit 
loss is the same when shifting to perfect competition or shifting to perfect 
competition without myopia: it corresponds to the average profit in the “business-as-
usual” situation. 
8. Conclusion 
While the empirical literature on the energy efficiency gap in the residential 
sector has primarily focused on consumer behavior, this paper develops a 
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comprehensive view of both demand-side and supply-side behaviors that 
occur in the UK refrigerator market. This allows us to investigate the influence 
of two market imperfections: the fact that consumers underestimate future 
energy costs and imperfect competition, which allows suppliers to charge 
prices above marginal production costs. 
We obtain results that moderate the importance of the intensively discussed 
problem of the energy efficiency gap. We find that consumers undervalue 
future energy costs by 35%, which is equivalent to applying an implicit 
discount rate of 11% to the stream of future electricity costs when calculating 
the net present value. This result is robust to many factors, in particular the 
average lifetime of appliances and expected energy prices. This leads to a 
9.2% increase of average energy use of sold appliances relative to a scenario 
with perfectly rational consumers. Imperfect competition yields an opposite 
impact as it reduces energy use by 4.2%. The joint effect of both imperfections 
is a modest 7.2% increase. The observed energy consumption level is thus not 
far from a perfectly competitive market with fully rational consumers. The 
welfare evaluation confirms this result: social welfare per refrigerator sold 
would only be £18.10 higher in the first best optimum. This corresponds to 
6.1% of the average refrigerator price. 
These empirical finding thus suggest a limited need for public policies to 
restore efficiency in the refrigerator market. Notwithstanding, one should 
obviously be cautious when deriving general policy implications, as the UK 
refrigerator market may present specificities. For example, energy labeling has 
been mandatory since 1995, which has arguably reduced myopia. This 
obligation however applies to all energy-using appliances sold in the European 
Union and labeling is also observed in many markets outside this region. 
However, to date no investigation has been made of how policies promoting 
energy efficiency mitigate or exacerbate the market power problem, and this 
analysis is left for future research. 
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Finally, an important limitation is that the analysis does not account for the 
long-run impact of consumer myopia and imperfect competition on product 
innovation. This weakness – observed in almost all empirical papers on the 
energy efficiency gap – probably leads to an underestimation of the size of the 
inefficiencies. For instance, myopia reduces manufacturers' incentives to 
launch energy-efficient refrigerators and withdraw inefficient models, an 
effect that is not analyzed here. 
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Appendices 
A-H are the main appendices. I-O includes elements for online publication. 
A: Alternative choices for the nests 
A weakness of the nested logit approach is the fact that the nest structure is 
arbitrarily chosen by the econometrician. To check the robustness of our 
results to the choice of nests, we run the estimations of the sales equation with 
alternative nests and report the results in Table A.1. The estimate of  γ varies 
across specifications, but remains below 1. 
 
Table A.1: First difference GMM estimation results of sales with 
alternative nests 
 Dependent variable: log. market share of product j 
 Nests based on:  
refrigerators vs. refrigerator-freezers No Yes Yes No 
Above/below median capacity No Yes No Yes 
Built-in/freestanding No No Yes Yes 
Importance of total electricity costs (γ) 0.7248** 
(2.26) 
0.6455*** 
(4.11) 
0.2695 
(1.25) 
0.6877*** 
(4.47) 
Utility for money (α) 0.0083 
(1.63) 
0.0045*** 
(3.41) 
0.0023*** 
(2.89) 
0.0046*** 
(3.48) 
Within-group correlation of error term 
(σ) for the demand equation 
n/a 
0.8587*** 
(17.81) 
1.075*** 
(25.32) 
0.8932*** 
(16.71) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
First difference Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,365 1,365 1,365 1,365 
Notes. Two instruments are used. They correspond to the fixed effects capturing year-on-year 
changes in the price of upright freezers and washing machines. t-statistics in brackets. 
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered on products. Results marked 
with *, ** and *** are statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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B: Construction of the instruments for the sales equation 
To calculate the implicit price of the two attributes (capacity and built-in vs 
free-standing), a hedonic pricing model is used (see the results in Table B.1). 
We run two regressions, one for freezers, and one for washing machines, to 
capture the evolution of the price of each subcategory of refrigeration 
appliance. This is done by including year-‘category of appliance’ (large/small 
and built-in/freestanding) specific fixed effects.  
In addition, we include product-specific fixed effects that control for all time-
invariant product features and therefore for any difference in the sample of 
appliances that we observe from one year to the next, and could be susceptible 
to bias the estimation of the evolution of the average price of the various 
subcategories of appliances. As explained previously, we also include brand-
specific time trends that control for the general development of brand-specific 
marketing strategies. 
We assign weights to each product j in our regressions. We do so to ensure 
that the regression results are representative of the market and to reduce the 
risk of measurement error on the average price of each model. The weights are 
identical for all of the observations of product j between 2002 and 2007, and 
correspond to the average of all of the sales registered by product j between 
2002 and 2007. 
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Table B.1:  Hedonic regressions to construct the instruments (freezers 
and washing machines) 
Dependent variable 
Price of washing 
machines 
Price of built-in 
freezers 
Price of 
freestanding 
freezers 
By year, by category of 
appliance fixed effects 
 
 
 
Small, 2002  0 0 
-18.8481 
(-0.46) 
Small, 2003  
-42.5061*** 
(-3.11) 
-2.5749 
(-0.12) 
-18.4543 
(-0.42) 
Small, 2004  
-75.2039*** 
(-2.85) 
-11.508 
(-0.31) 
-5.8397 
(-0.11) 
Small, 2005  
-125.6751*** 
(-3.18) 
-16.0016 
(-0.29) 
-7.9437 
(-0.13) 
Small, 2006  
-159.7466*** 
(-3.05) 
-43.4277 
(-0.6) 
15.2585 
(0.2) 
Small, 2007  
-205.2927*** 
(-3.13) 
-38.6044 
(-0.45) 
19.0729 
(0.21) 
Large, 2002 
37.824 
(1.45) 
10.3909 
(0.24) 
8.3791 
(0.28) 
Large, 2003  
-3.9397 
(-0.12) 
1.2222 
(0.03) 
-2.8049 
(-0.08) 
Large, 2004  
-57.4207 
(-1.59) 
13.543 
(0.31) 
9.7592 
(0.21) 
Large, 2005  
-128.0074*** 
(-2.94) 
4.5595 
(0.08) 
17.6663 
(0.3) 
Large, 2006 
-174.3192*** 
(-3.18) 
12.0702 
(0.17) 
27.5309 
(0.38) 
Large, 2007  
-218.5002*** 
(-3.24) 
-14.9726 
(-0.18) 
29.2075 
(0.33) 
Fixed effects Yes Yes 
Brand-specific time trends Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.31 0.28 
Number of observations 1,637 851 
Notes. t-statistics in brackets. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered on 
products. Results marked with *, ** and *** are statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. ‘Small’ means below sample median, ‘Large’ is above. Regression is weighted 
for each observation of product j by the total sales of product j over 2002-2007. 
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C: Estimation of electricity price forecasts with the ARIMA 
model 
1. Testing for different ARIMA specifications 
The ARIMA models can handle lags in the autoregressive (AR) term and in 
the moving average (MA) term. Moreover, they can be expressed in levels or 
in difference. We tested for different combinations and found that the best fit 
was provided by an ARIMA model with a one-lag AR-term and one lag for 
the MA-term. These results are evident from Table C.1, which corresponds to 
the fit of various ARIMA specifications for the price expectations in 2007.
27
 
Table C.1: Results for different ARIMA specifications 
Independent 
variables 
Base 
model 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
Lag of 
autocorrelated 
term 
0.9968*** 
(197.51) 
0.9976*** 
(227.27) 
  0.7134*** 
(17.41) 
 
Lag of moving 
average term 
0.5887*** 
(12.09) 
 0.9588*** 
(39.71) 
  0.5848*** 
(11.78) 
Constant 1.1748*** 
(4.47) 
1.180*** 
(4.44) 
0.9772*** 
(72.70) 
0.0015 
(1.52) 
0.016 
(0.78) 
0.015 
(1.37) 
Standard 
deviation of the 
white-noise 
disturbance 
0.0077*** 
(25.40) 
0.0099*** 
(27.44) 
0.0536*** 
(14.53) 
0.0098*** 
(25.38) 
0.0069*** 
(25.10) 
0.0077*** 
(25.21) 
Equation in first 
difference 
No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
observations 
133 133 133 132 132 132 
Notes. t-statistics in brackets. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity with clustering 
of products. Results marked with one to three stars are statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 
1% respectively. The models are run on the price index of electricity corrected by the 
consumer price index (2005 = 1). 
                                                 
27
 ARIMA models in table 18 only include lags at t – 1. We tested for the inclusion of more 
lags but these models do not fit the data as well as this specification. Either one of the 
coefficients of the model was no longer statistically significant, as in (c), (d) and (e), or the 
models were not converging for all the years for which expectations need to be modelled. 
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2. Results of the ARIMA model for the different years for which 
expectations are modeled 
Expectations for a given year are modeled with the data available from 1996 
up to the last month of the previous year. For example, expectations in 2003 
are assumed to be based on electricity price information available from 
January 1996 to December 2002. Table C.2 presents the results of each 
ARIMA model used to produce price expectations for purchases that take 
place in 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007. 
Table C.2: Results of ARIMA models used to produce rational price 
expectations 
Year when the 
forecasts are to 
be made 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Independent 
variables 
      
Lag of AR-term 0.9964*** 
(58.85) 
0.9971*** 
(69.98) 
0.9972*** 
(83.93) 
0.9950*** 
(93.06) 
0.9945*** 
(78.12) 
0.9968*** 
(197.51) 
Lag of MA-term 0.3931*** 
(4.29) 
0.3842*** 
(4.64) 
0.3732*** 
(4.85) 
0.4271*** 
(6.13) 
0.4632*** 
(7.12) 
0.5887*** 
(12.09) 
Constant 1.0001*** 
(10.17) 
0.9964*** 
(9.67) 
0.9994*** 
(10.27) 
1.029*** 
(13.02) 
1.057*** 
(6.84) 
1.1748*** 
(4.47) 
Standard 
deviation of the 
white-noise 
disturbance 
0.0064*** 
(21.45) 
0.0060*** 
(24.08) 
0.0058*** 
(26.74) 
0.0059*** 
(26.54) 
0.0062*** 
(25.76) 
0.0077*** 
(25.40) 
Equation in first 
difference 
No No No No No No 
Number of 
observations 
73 85 97 109 121 133 
Notes. t-statistics in brackets. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity with clustering 
of products. Results marked with one to three stars are statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 
1% respectively. The models are run on the price index of electricity corrected by the 
consumer price index (2005 = 1). 
The figure below plots the predicted prices obtained for each year of the 
forecast. In general, the output of the forecast is close to a random walk, with a 
tendency to return to the average of the previous years. 
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Figure C.1: Expected electricity prices as forecasted with the ARIMA model 
(2005 = 100) 
 
D: Alternative assumptions for calculating operating costs 
1. Different appliance lifetimes 
The calculation of the operating costs in the base model is based on AMDEA 
(2008) information about appliance lifetimes (12.8 years for refrigerators and 
17.5 years for combined refrigerator-freezers). Table D.1 presents the results 
where the lifetimes of both kinds of appliances are assumed to be 20% higher 
and lower. It shows that changes in our assumption have a limited impact on 
the results. This is mostly because operating costs are discounted: electricity 
consumption over 10-15 years is given a low weight in any case. 
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Table D.1: First difference IV-GMM estimation results of the sales 
equation, with different appliance lifetimes 
Dependent variable: log. market share of product j 
Assumptions on lifetime 
(years) 
Base specification -20% +20% 
Refrigerators 12.8 10.24 15.36 
Combined refrigerator-
freezers 
17.5 14 21 
Independent variables    
Importance of total 
electricity costs (γ) 
0.6538*** 
(4.32) 
0.742*** 
(4.33) 
0.5974*** 
(4.31) 
Utility for money (α) 0.0052*** 
(3.51) 
0.0052*** 
(3.51) 
0.0052*** 
(3.52) 
Within-group correlation of 
error term (σ) for the 
demand equation 
0.8889*** 
(16.14) 
0.889*** 
(16.12) 
0.8889*** 
(16.15) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,365 1,365 1,365 
Notes. Two instruments are used. They correspond to the fixed effects capturing year-on-year 
changes in the price of upright freezers and washing machines. The nests on which σ is 
calculated distinguish refrigerators from combined refrigerator-freezers, built-in from 
freestanding appliances, and appliances by capacity (over and below the sample median). t-
statistics in brackets. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered on 
products. Results marked with *, ** and *** are statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
2. Marginal vs. average prices 
In the base specification, we use the average electricity price to compute 
forecasts, but this conflicts with the assumption of perfectly rational 
consumers, who would in theory use marginal price information to form 
expectations. Unfortunately, data on marginal prices for the study period was 
not available. As argued in the paper, the results are unbiased if the fixed non-
metered component remained constant over the sample period, and biased if it 
was not constant. In Table D.2, we give results for the sales equation in which 
a time-varying estimate of the marginal price is used to calculate operating 
costs. 
The marginal price is estimated as follows. According to DECC (2013b), the 
fixed component corresponds to around 11% of UK electricity bills. We 
assume that, during the study period, the share remained fixed at 11%. Under 
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this assumption, Table D.2 shows consumer myopia would be reduced, as 
consumers would underestimate energy costs by 27%. 
Table D.2: First difference IV-GMM estimation results of the sales 
equation, where expected electricity prices are estimated using time-
varying marginal prices  
Independent variables  
Importance of total electricity costs (γ) 0.7346*** 
(4.32) 
Utility for money (α) 0.0052*** 
(3.51) 
Within-group correlation of error term (σ) for the 
demand equation 
0.8889*** 
(16.14) 
Year dummies Yes 
First difference Yes 
Observations 1,365 
Notes. Two instruments are used. They correspond to the fixed effects capturing year-on-year 
changes in the price of upright freezers and washing machines. The nests on which σ is 
calculated distinguish refrigerators from combined refrigerator-freezers, built-in from 
freestanding appliances, and appliances by capacity (over and below the sample median). t-
statistics in brackets. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered on 
products. Results marked with *, ** and *** are statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
E: Instrumentation of the operating costs to mitigate 
measurement errors 
Several reasons why the operating cost values use in this analysis may be 
affected by measurement errors have been discussed. Here, we check how 
such errors potentially impact our results by running a model in which the 
operating cost is instrumented. We use the lagged electricity prices to compute 
the operating costs of appliances as if they were functioning during the 
previous year. Operating costs from the previous year are then used to 
instrument expected and actualized operating costs. The assumption is that 
past operating costs are likely to be correlated with expected operating costs, 
but they should not be correlated with the demand for appliances. This 
assumption seems reasonable considering that electricity costs varied 
significantly over the study period.  
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Results for the sales equations show limited differences with the results 
obtained in the base specification. 
Table E.1: First difference IV-GMM estimation results of the sales 
equation, with instrumentation of the operating costs 
Independent variables  
Importance of total electricity costs (γ) 0.5676*** 
(3.53) 
Utility for money (α) 0.0051*** 
(3.48) 
Within-group correlation of error term 
(σ) for the demand equation 
0.8888*** 
(16.37) 
Year dummies Yes 
Observations 1,365 
Notes. Three instruments are used. The first two correspond to the fixed effects capturing 
year-on-year changes in the price of upright freezers and washing machines. The third 
instrument corresponds to electricity costs as calculated with one-year lagged electricity 
prices, since expected electricity costs are endogenous in this setting. The nests on which σ is 
calculated distinguish refrigerators from combined refrigerator-freezers, built-in from 
freestanding appliances, and appliances by capacity (over and below the sample median). t-
statistics in brackets. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered on 
products. Results marked with *, ** and *** are statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
F: Estimation method for the average markup 
Markup estimation 
The calibration of individual markups is done in reference to an average 
markup of 19.6%. We consider that any product j below a given sales level M 
has a markup equal to 0 due to lack of market power. Beyond M, the markup 
increases with product j’s market share in the proportions estimated with Eq. 
(7). We choose the value of M such that the sales-weighted average markup 
equals 19.6%.
28
 In addition, we put an upper bound on estimated markups at 
the 99% percentile to ensure that the simulation results are not driven by 
outliers. 
                                                 
28
 . Below 77 sales, the markup is assumed to be zero and then increases in line with Eq. (7). 
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The method used to estimate the average markup is the following. Roger 
(1995) shows that markups can be estimated from the difference between the 
Solow residual (   ) and the price-based Solow residual (    ): 
                 
With     (       )  (       ) .    ,    ,     and     are 
respectively the log differences in output, capital, the price of output and the 
cost of capital.    is an error term. The coefficient B is directly related to the 
markup μ such that:     (   ) . Görg and Warzynski (2006) adapt 
Roeger’s equation to the standard financial information provided by firms. We 
follow their methodology and estimate: 
    (   )        (    )    (    (   )     (  ))
  (    (   )  (    (   )     (  ))) 
    is the operating revenue,      is the cost of goods sold,     tangible 
assets and    the firm-specific cost of capital, such that: 
       
     
    
 
With     the index of investment good prices,    the real interest rate,    the 
depreciation rate and    the corporate tax rate.
29
 
With this methodology in mind, we gather financial data for a panel of UK 
firms operating in two sectors: a) the manufacture of electrical equipment; and 
b) the retail sale of electrical household appliances in specialized stores. The 
data was extracted from the ORBIS Database and was available for 2006-
2015.  
                                                 
29
 Görg and Warzynski (2006) include the cost of employees and the cost of materials in their 
equation instead of the cost of sold goods. We have adapted their equation due to data 
constraints. However, the cost of sold goods mostly consists in the cost of materials and the 
cost of labor directly used to produce the goods. 
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We calibrate    using the UK consumer price index for      since we lack an 
investment price index. We calculate    based on the Bank of England 
weighted-average interest rate of time deposits with fixed original maturity 
above one year from private non-financial corporations. We subtract the 
inflation rate from this to obtain a real interest rate. The depreciation rate is 
calculated for each firm based on declared depreciation and amortization 
losses.  
As for the estimation per se, we consider that the error component term of our 
regression includes a firm-specific fixed effect and therefore estimate the 
equation above with demeaning instead of standard OLS. In addition, the data 
we use is for 2006-2015 whereas we are interested in the markups for 2002-
2007. Therefore, we need to investigate whether   might have evolved over 
time, due to changes in competition intensity. This is done in additional 
specifications where we assume         . The estimation results are 
provided in Table F.1, separately for both sectors. 
Table F.1: Fixed effect markup estimation 
Independent variables Manufacturing sector Retail sector 
Log difference in cost of 
goods sold 
0.5883*** 
(12.69) 
0.5682*** 
(11.99) 
0.6792*** 
(12.20) 
0.6678*** 
(13.34) 
Log difference in tangible 
assets plus cost of capital 
-0.0256 
(-1.21) 
-0.0002 
(-0.01) 
0.0082 
(0.82) 
0.0144 
(1.07) 
  (or   ) 0.0796*** 
(3.26) 
0.1897* 
(1.90) 
0.0371*** 
(3.23) 
0.0890*** 
(3.11) 
     
-0.0213 
(-1.39) 
 -0.0099** 
(2.31) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,703 2,703 536 536 
Notes. Dependent variable is log difference of operating revenue. Standard errors are clustered 
at firm level. 
We find a value of   equal to 8.0% in the manufacturing sector, with no 
evidence of increased or decreased competition over time. The corresponding 
markup is 8.6% (95% confidence interval is 3.0-14.3%). On the other hand, 
we find evidence of decreasing competition in the retail sector (   statistically 
significant at 5%). If we extrapolate the value of   in the retail sector for 
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2002-2007 based on the estimates of    and   , we obtain a value of 9.9%. 
The corresponding markup is 11.0% (95% confidence interval is 3.1-18.9%). 
Adding the two markups for the manufacture and retail of electric appliances 
gives an average markup of 19.6%, with a 95% confidence interval of 9.9%-
29.3%. The average estimate of 19.6% is the one we use as our base value in 
the welfare evaluation.  
G: Sensitiveness analysis of simulations 
We perform a sensitiveness analysis of our simulations with the lower (9.9%) 
and upper (29.3%) values of the 95% confidence interval of our average 
markup estimate. The results of the welfare evaluation are globally similar, 
even though the magnitude of imperfect competition (and with it the average 
profits cut down under perfect competition) changes. 
Table G.1: Simulated impacts of myopia and imperfect competition on 
the energy consumption with different average markups 
 Energy consumption (kWh/year) 
 Markup of 9.9% Markup of 29.3% 
Observed situation 310.2 310.2 
Non-myopic consumers 281.6 283.6 
Perfect competition (zero mark-ups) 316.1 330.6 
Perfect competition and non-myopic consumers 282.4 293.9 
 
Table G.2: Welfare impacts of myopia and imperfect competition with 
different average markups  
Welfare impacts * Consumer surplus  Average profit Welfare 
Markup of 9.9% 
Withdrawing myopia +24.1 -11.4 +12.8 
Perfect competition +34.7 -29.3 +5.4 
Both +49.1 -29.3 +19.8 
Markup of 29.3% 
Withdrawing myopia +26.5 -18.4 +8.1 
Perfect competition +109.2 -86.4 +22.8 
Both +113.6 -86.4 +27.1 
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*: unit is 2005 pounds. Values are for an average sale. When myopia prevails, we have 
subtracted unforeseen energy costs from the consumer surplus. The sales-weighted average 
price of products included in the welfare evaluation is 296 pounds. 
H: Modifications to the set of controls used in the supply 
equation 
The regression below increases the stringency of the controls used in the 
supply equation. We first introduce fully interacted fixed effects: by-nest by-
brand by-year fixed effects. Results lose some precision but are unchanged 
compared to our baseline specification. 
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Table H.1: Fixed effects 2SLS Estimation results for the price equation 
with fully interacted fixed effects 
Dependent variable Log. price of product j 
Markup,   0.0759* 
(1.79) 
Year x nest dummies x brand dummies Yes 
Product fixed effects Yes 
Weak identification test   
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic  12.13 
Max. IV bias 10-15% 
Observations 2,421 
Notes. t-statistics are in brackets. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and 
clustered on products. Results marked with *, ** and *** are statistically significant 
at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Another possibility is to introduce nest-specific or brand-specific quadratic 
trends. Likewise, results are quite similar in magnitude. 
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Table H.2: Fixed effects 2SLS Estimation results for the price equation 
with nest-specific quadratic interactions between height and time 
Dependent variable Log. price of 
product j 
Log. price of 
product j 
Markup,   0.0438** 
(2.40) 
0.0818*** 
(2.60) 
Year x nest dummies Yes Yes 
Year x brand dummies Yes Yes 
Nest-specific quadratic interactions 
between height and time  
Yes No 
Brand-specific quadratic interactions 
between height and time 
No Yes 
Product fixed effects Yes Yes 
Weak identification test    
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic  29.95 14.07 
Max. IV bias <10% 10-15% 
Observations 2,421 2,421 
Notes. t-statistics are in brackets. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and 
clustered on products. Results marked with *, ** and *** are statistically significant 
at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
